China Travels Mapless on the Road to Being a Great Power

Source：Financial Times

Author：Philip Stephens

There is no plan. I had assumed that Chinahad a plan  for everything. On the long flight to Shanghai I read that Beijing had already charted the economy"s course as far ahead as 2050. After a brief period when it seemed that American
power would go forever uncontested, China"s extraordinary economic
performance is now reshaping the geopolitical landscape. Surely this ordered,
deliberative nation had mapped out the role it would play as a great
power?

I was mistaken. Even as much of the rest of the world struggles to
adjust to what is being called the Asian century, the message from
China itself seems strangely
equivocal. Listening to Chinese scholars, military figures, diplomats and
Communist party officials this past week, I took it to be roughly as follows:
yes, we want, and expect, to be listened to with due respect by other leading
powers, not least by the US; no, we are not sure yet as to what we intend to
say.

The occasion for this instant education was a symposium in Shanghaiheadlined China"s Role as a Global Player. The
gathering"s sponsorship, led by the international affairs faculty at the
graduate school of the University of Geneva and the National Intelligence
Council of the US, itself seemed to speak to the openness of China"s foreign
policy debate. It is not often that one listens to US intelligence analysts
debate strategic options with officers of the People"s Liberation
Army.

There were points of certainty, of course, on the Chinese side. Some
in the west may see Taiwan as a foreign policy issue. For
China it is one of national
integrity: no one should harbour the faintest scintilla of doubt about Beijing"s resolve to make
a reality of One China.

Nor do Chinese policymakers seem in any mood to seek to defuse the
present, dangerous tensions with Japan. History, they judge, demands
that Tokyo show
appropriate humility. I heard someone remark that China and Japan had never
before been strong at the same moment. The implication was faintly
menacing.

The facts of China"s international resurgence are
clear enough. The unquenchable thirst for natural resources has prompted
Beijing to build
a network of partnerships and alliances across every continent. Oil, metal and
mineral deals have been buttressed by a political and diplomatic effort of
unprecedented scale. Few, if any, other world leaders collect as many air miles
as President Hu Jianto and prime minister Wen Jiabao. Later this year they will
host a unique summit in Beijing for all 45
leaders of resource-richAfrica.

Nor did I detect any apology for this singular pursuit of national
interest in securing supplies of raw materials. Western empires, after all,
plundered the resources of the rest of the world. China, I heard,
was striking commercial bargains as profitable to its suppliers as to itself. As
for the charge that deals were being struck with some of the world"s more
unpleasant regimes, the west has scarcely been pure in its choice of
allies.

For all that, the hesitancies are equally unmistakable. Until quite
recently the self-description of China"s return to the club of great
powers was of a "peaceful" rise. The purpose was clear enough - to mark the
distinction between today"s China and Germany at the
end of the 19th century. History might be littered with the clashes between
existing and emerging powers, but China would be
different.

Even that deliberately self-deprecating description, however, has
been quietly dropped. "Rise" was deemed by the diplomatic class to be too
threatening, even when coupled with "peaceful". The diplomats are anxious to
play down China"s power. It is still a
relatively weak nation, they observe, destined to lag behind the
US for many decades to
come.

In any event - and there is broad agreement on this - easing the
intense social and political strains accompanying China"s economic
transformation is a far bigger task for the leadership than any on the
international horizon. For all China"s success, most of its citizens
still live in rural poverty.

So the favoured phrases now are "peaceful development" and
"harmonious world". What the words actually mean, beyond expressing
China"s wish to soothe the anxieties
of others in the international community, is less clear.

The mood is more assertive - towards the USas well as Japan. The
universalism of America"s
strategic commitment to promote democracy around the world jars with
China"s long adherence to the
principle of non-interference - and, of course, with its political system. The
corollary of non-interference, I was told, was respect for diversity: "No two
things are of the same pattern."Washington take note.

There are other, broader tensions. If Chinanow
expects a place at the top table in the governing councils of international
affairs, it also clings to its position as a leader of the non-aligned movement.
More than once I detected tacit admissions that the leadership is still
uncomfortable with the responsibilities that come with great power
status.

Chinais playing a more active role at the United Nations. It is about to
expand its peacekeeping role in Lebanon. It has signalled a
commitment to non-proliferation by joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
counters the spread of sensitive technology. But elsewhere the tensions are
increasingly apparent.

National interest in Sudan"s oil resources and the policy of non-
interference have thus far prompted China to block moves in the Security Council
to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur. Beijing insists that any such move must have
the permission of the Sudanese government. Yet it feels uncomfortable with the
opprobrium that comes with being singled out as the obstacle to efforts to ease
the plight of the Darfur
refugees.

The same ambivalence has clouded the Security Council"s deliberations
about Iran"s nuclear programme.
China has signed up to the
proposition that Tehran should not be permitted to pursue a
nuclear weapons programme, but it bridles at sanctions. Thus far it has
contrived to hide behind Russia. But if China wants to
play a part in making the rules of the international system, it cannot
indefinitely avoid a responsibility to enforce them. There comes a point when
non-interference ceases to be an option.

The Shanghaisymposium heard many
times that China (unlike the
US) would "never seek hegemony in the
world". It does intend to deploy its new-found power in international affairs.
But if it has a plan, it is not yet ready to share it.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited
2006

作者：英国《金融时报》菲利普•斯蒂芬斯(Philip Stephens)

2006年9月22日
星期五
译者/何黎

   没有计划。我原以为，中国对任何事情都会有计划。在飞往上海的漫长航程中，我从有关材料上看到，中国政府已经制订了直至2050年的经济发展规划。有那么短短的几年，美国的超级大国地位似乎永远不会遭遇挑战，但中国非凡的经济表现，正重塑着地缘政治格局。这个凡事有条理、慎重考虑的国家，自然会规划好自己将要扮演的大国角色？

我错了。尽管全球其它国家都在奋力调整自己，以适应所谓的“亚洲世纪”，但中国自身所传达的信息令人奇怪地模棱两可。最近，在聆听了中国学者、军界要人、外交官和共产党官员的发言之后，我将其粗略概括如下：是的，我们希望并期待其它大国（包括美国）带着应有的尊重倾听我们的声音；不，我们还没确定要说什么。

让我受到这次“即时教育”的，是在上海举行的一个以“中国的全球大国角色”(China’s Role as a Global Player)为题的座谈会。日内瓦大学(University of Geneva)研究生院国际事务系和美国国家情报委员会(National Intelligence Council)是这次座谈会的牵头组织者，而这些主办者的身份本身，似乎表明了有关中国外交政策争论的公开性。能够听到美国情报分析人士与中国人民解放
军军官辩论战略选择的问题，机会很难得。

当然，在中国一方，有些事是确定的。西方一些国家也许将台湾问题视为外交政策问题。而对中国来说，这是一个“国家完整”的问题：任何人都不应该对中国政府实现“一个中国”的决心抱有一星半点儿的怀疑。

中国的决策者似乎也没什么心情，去设法缓和中国与日本之间目前危险的紧张局势。他们认为，历史要求日本政府表现出恰当的谦卑。我听到有人谈论到，中国和日本历史上从未同时强大过，这让人感到隐隐的威胁。

中国在国际舞台上复兴的事实显而易见。对自然资源的渴求，促使中国政府在各大洲都建立了合作与联盟关系网。在空前规模的政治和外交努力的支持下，一系列石油、金属和矿石交易纷纷达成。几乎没有哪个世界领导人像中国国家主席胡锦涛和国务院总理温家宝那样，飞行过那么多里程。今年晚些时候，他们还将在北京主办
一次独一无二的峰会，资源丰富的45个非洲国家的领导人将悉数参加。

对这种在获取原材料供应上一味追求国家利益的行为，我也没有察觉到中国抱有任何歉意。毕竟，西方帝国也劫掠过世界其它地区的资源。我听说，中国达成的商业合同寻求的是供应方和自己“双赢”。至于被指责与世界上某些“比较讨厌”的政权达成交易，西方国家选择盟友的历史也不纯洁。

出于所有这些原因，中国的犹豫也很好理解。直到不久以前，中国对重返超级大国俱乐部的自我描述一直是“和平”崛起。目的已经够清楚了——把今日的中国区别于19世纪末的德国。历史上，现存大国与新兴大国之间爆发冲突的事例比比皆是，但中国将会有所不同。

然而，甚至连这种故意自谦的描述，也被悄无声息地抛弃了。外交界认为“崛起”一词太具威胁性，即便加上“和平”的字眼也是如此。外交家急切希望“淡化”中国的实力。他们认为，中国仍是一个实力相对较弱的国家，注定在未来数十年内继续落后于美国。

不管怎样，对于中国领导层而言，缓解那些伴随中国经济改革而产生的巨大的社会和政治压力，是一项远比任何国际事务都要重大的任务，而在这一点上，各方达成了广泛的一致。尽管中国取得了一些成功，但其多数国民仍生活在贫困的农村。

因此，人们如今青睐的词汇是“和平发展”和“和谐世界”。这些表述除了显示中国有意缓和国际上其它国家的忧虑之外，实际意义不那么明确。

面对美国和日本，中国人表现得比较自信。美国的战略是在全球范围内致力于推进民主，而中国则长期坚持不干涉内政原则，并坚持自己的政治体系。有人告诉我，不干涉内政的结果就是尊重多元化：“没有两件东西是一样的。”美国政府应予以留意。

还有一些更广泛的紧张局面。中国现在一方面希望在国际事务高层管理委员会中获得一席之地，另一方面也要坚持其作为不结盟运动领袖的身份。我不止一次察觉到一种默认，即中国领导人对于大国地位带来的责任仍不习惯。

中国在联合国(UN)发挥着越来越积极的作用。中国将向黎巴嫩增派维和人员，还加入了防止敏感技术扩散的核供应国集团(Nuclear Suppliers Group)，显示出其坚持核不扩散的承诺。但在其它领域，紧张局面正变得日益明显。

中国对苏丹石油资源的国家利益和它坚持的不干涉别国内政的外交政策，促使它阻止了安理会(Security Council)向苏丹达尔福尔地区派驻维和人员的提案。中国政府坚持表示，任何此类行动必须得到苏丹政府的许可。但结果是，中国被指责为缓解达尔福尔难
民困境的障碍，这一骂名让其感到不快。

中国的这种矛盾情绪，也令安理会关于伊朗核计划的决策前途未卜。中国已支持不允许伊朗政府推进核
武器项目的提议，但在对伊朗实施制裁的问题上止步不前。到目前为止，中国一直藏在俄罗斯身后。然而，如果中国希望自己在国际规则的制定过程中发挥一定作用的话，它就不能无限期地逃避实施这些规则的责任。不干涉内政的原则总有不适用的时候。

此次上海座谈会多次出现有关中国（与美国不同）“决不寻求世界霸权”的说法。中国确实希望在国际事务中行使其新发现的实力。但如果说中国已经有了一个计划的话，它仍未准备好向世界公布这个计划。